an excellent frame of reference for examining the consequences of these important changes underway in the Soviet Union. However, this process of change will also act to modify this frame of reference itself. Consequently, we must not only understand the new defensive doctrine in relationship to the current Soviet strategic culture, but also realize that the process of change will have a modifying effect on that culture. Soviet strategic culture is the result of years of socialization that has conditioned thought and behavior. 2 The professional members of the Soviet military are a product of their strategic culture.
As we measure the effects of the new defensive doctrine on the SovieL military, we must also keep in mind that the means by which we measure the outcome are also changing. A permanent struggle with states, because they or their ruling classes are hostile. States now socialist are secure only as long as MoscoW's suzerainty is maintained. States now capitalist are subject to conversion by all means short of war because their threat cannot be otherwise attenuated. States considered "progressive" or "national democratic" will be watched and aided by Moscow-s guardianship and example.
-A permanent struggle between classes. Change is inherent in the world revolutionary process, which is advance by legal and illegal communist parties, and proxy, surrogate elements.
Classlessness -one large collective -is the only permanent solution given firm, central leadership from Moscow.
-A strong state, guided by resolute leaders, is required to mobilize the entire country and its resources to serve fundamental Soviet security interests.
Others cannot be depended upon to guarantee Soviet security. The USSR will marshal, coordinate and command socialist forces. Moscow-s primacy is essential to ensure the sanctity of Soviet soil.
-Continual sacrifice is necessary to preserve the state. Military forces guard the society which it serves and protects. Quantitative, qualitative, political and military-technical dimensions of military power must be sufficient to prevail over all possible enemies, separately or combined.
-The political utility of military power, where superiority at every escalatory levels required to attain the political aim of war through violent or, preferably, non-violent means. The greatest success and supreme achievement of military power is when , by its presence, readiness and capabilities, it need not be used to secure the political objective.
Readiness to secure and protect the Soviet homeland and its interest. Military forces, despite their size and capability, are useless if they are not prepared to do their duty. Those in responsibility know best the nature and conduct of future war, with its requisite political and military-technical requirements.
Victory is the goal aggressive offensive action makes possible. This is not narrow military victory, but the attainment of the political objective of war -the reason war was pursued and the goal which governed its conduct. All appropriate means and methods are sanctioned toward this conduct. 8 As we use this notion of Soviet strategic culture as a lens through which we will view the transformation taking place within the Soviet military, it is important to understand that this "lens" is not fixed. Culture, by definition, is, inter alia, a process of history and experience. The experiences currently taking place are changing the totality of this culture, thus the lens through which we view it must be adjusted accordingly. The Soviet Union is acting in ways that represent a break from its traditional, dominant strategic culture. 9 What we are seeing in the Soviet Union represents a Soviet thinkers had come to the realization that defensive actions were a necessary complement to offensive actions.
Consequently, more attention to the defense became necessary in training, literature, and discussion.23 A natural outgrowth of this analysis was a renewed emphasis on the defense, and the realization that the defense was one aspect of warfare that they had ignored for too long.
2-1
The understanding that the offense was the singularly -No war, especially nuclear war, can be considered a rational continuation of politics.
-Political means of enhancing security are more effective than military-technical means.
-Security is mutual; Soviet security cannot be enhanced by increasing other states-insecurity.
-Reasonable sufficiency should be the basis for the future development of the combat capabilities of the armed forces.
-Soviet military strategy should be based on non-provocative defense, not offensive capabilities and operations.25
The extent to which their political masters were to go parity is the decisive factor in preventing war, and that the current force levels are too high and should be reduced through negotiations. Both espouse the reorganization of military forces to a more defensive structure and agree with the gains to be made from a better quality force. They continue to believe, however, that the offense continues to have a primary role in warfare. 4 The degree to which the offense is applied delineates these two moderate sub-groups.
The first sub-group is represented by what has been recently taught at the Voroshilov Academy as witnessed by the U.S. Congressional delegation that visited in October,
1989. This group accepts a "purely defensive" philosophy by allowing the aggressor to achieve a penetration. The penetration is then subjected to a counterattack followed by a powerful counteroffensive. This counteroffensive would not only eject the aggressor from the Soviet territory, but retain the capability to continue that counteroffensive into enemy territory. 5 Obviously, a force with the strength to defend, counterattack, and launch a counteroffensive is a potent one and certainly not "purely defensive." There is little difference between a counteroffensive and an offensive except timing. At a minimum, this decisive operation is meant to eject the enemy from Soviet territory, but not to ultimately destroy the aggressor force wherever he may go. 6 As a predominantly civilian group, the reformist movement is unique in the recent developments in Soviet military theory. Their position can best be described as a non-provocative defense. They maintain that both sides should reduce force levels to the point where neither has the capability to initiate offensive operations, only to defend. 7 More dramatic is the notion that defensive actions are The new defensive doctrine also strikes at the heart o1 two other closely related aspects of Soviet strategic culture. Conversion to a non-provocative defense denies the ability to gain escalatory superiority. Since escalatory superiority is no longer a goal, less conventional force structure is required to achieve security. Since a large and expensive force structure is no longer necessary, the idea of sacrifice and hardship to sustain such a large force becomes less relevant. This represents a two-edged sword for the military. On one hand they clearly see the advantages to be gained from a stronger national economy, a more efficient industrial base, and a higher quality 
CONCLUSIONS
The most important conclusion of this study is that Soviet strategic culture remains an important analytical tool for understanding not only how and why the Soviets think militarily, but as a predictive device as well. This culture is now at a significant break-point in the continuing process of its development. To fully benefit from its analytical capability, its previous form must be understood just as thoroughly as the events that are transforming it.
36
The new defensive doctrine is but one indicator of the radical shift occurring in Soviet strategic culture. nany other factors are influencing this process of change as well. These other forces, such as arms control, the role of nationalism, the apparent dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, German reunification, the future role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union are but a few of the events that will forever change the face of Soviet strategic culture. These too must be considered and analyzed to fully envision possible outcomes for the Soviet military.
The realization of these changes will occur when action shifts from academic and theoretical debates to the armed forces of the Soviet Union as they begin to execute the new defensive doctrine. Their training exercises, training literature, force structure, and force positioning will
give us clues as to how defensive they intend to become.
Until this type of evidence is secured, we would be well-advised to pay attention to the various options the Soviets retain for their new defensive doctrine.
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